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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The destructiveness of 20th century military technology has made it all the
more important to reduce the incidence of war. The United Nations was founded,
as the preamble of the charter puts it, ‘"to save succeeding generations from the
scourge ot war.” The organization was created around the assumption of great
power unity and this was expressed in the charter which gave special privileges
and responsibilities to the Big Five powers, such as the right to veto in the Security
Council .
1
The founding fathers of the UN assumed that the major powers would
not fight each other or any other nation, and that they would work together to
maintain peace. It was also expected that the Big Five would provide leadership
and be willing to use their forces to “prevent or suppress all cases of aggression”
However, this great power unanimity and collective action were rarely present in
the UN during the years of the Cold War, due to the ideological conflict and
competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. The UN was often
unable to take any action to maintain peace and security because of a lack of
cooperation between the two superpowers. On many occasions both sides
threatened or used their veto power to prevent the organization from getting
involved in international conflicts.
1
Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plowshares: The Problems and Progress of International
Organization (New York: Random House, 1959) 79.
2 Claude 83
3
Peter R Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations: Reality and Ideal (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1984)97.
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In this thesis 1 assess whether the UN actually enjoyed the increased
efficacy in helping states settle conflict and prevent or limit warfare that many
analysts of international relations believed would follow the end of the Cold War 4
I first establish the level ofUN Security Council involvement in dispute settlement
by tracking what proportion of interstate disputes were referred to it. I then assess
the extent ot UN success in helping abate, isolate, end armed hostilities stemming
from the conflict, and settle each conflict. Since UN success may depend on
features ot the particular conflicts referred to it, I look for patterns of success by
examining certain basic characteristics of each dispute: its intensity, the extent of
actual warfare, its spread to include additional states and the relative power of the
states involved. Doing so helps establish whether features of the dispute have an
effect separate from the degree of great power unity and leadership displayed by
the permanent members of the Security Council.
To provide a fuller assessment, I look at not only the activities of the
Security Council, but also to activity in the judgments of the International Court of
Justice in cases relating to political conflicts. I also assess the activities of the
three regional organizations most active in regional dispute settlement- the
Organization of American States, Organization of African Unity and the Arab
League- since they can serve as alternatives to or supplements ofUN efforts to
help settle disputes.
4
Such as Ingvar Carlsson, “A New International Order through the United Nations,” Security
Dialogue 23(1992) 8; and Thomas G Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, “Moscow’s U N Policy,”
Foreign Policy 79 ( 1 990) 94
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To permit direct comparison with earlier periods, I analyze the UN’s post
Cold War experience, employing the methods used by Ernst B. Haas in the most
extensive study of UN efforts to resolve disputes during the Cold War era. In his
analysis, Haas identified several distinct periods ofUN activity .' In the period
from 1945 to 1947, according to Haas, the UN operated in a duopolistic system,
with consensus between the Soviet Union and the United States facilitating its
success in conflict resolution. However in the period between 1948 and 1955
bipolarity developed and the Soviet Union vetoed any actions that it thought would
increase American dominance. The US then used its majority to establish the
“Uniting for Peace” norm of using the General Assembly to authorize conflict
resolution efforts when the Security Council became stalemated. Haas noted that
this was followed by a period of “permissive engagement” from 1956 to 1970
during which the salience of the Cold War ebbed. UN conflict resolution efforts
were backed by a changing coalition of states and often the US was an enthusiastic
supporter while the Soviets decreased the use of their veto. However, in the period
after 1970, superpower readiness to use the UN declined; the superpowers only
supported UN involvement when they perceived that it would accord with their
own interests. In some cases they were indifferent to the conflict; in others they
were closely involved, either to weaken the other’s global position or prevent the
other from weakening its own.
5
Ernst B Haas, “Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organization, 1945-1981,"
International Organization Vol 32, no 2 (1983): 189
3
Haas noted that the UN had been successful prior to the 1970s when the
two superpowers, though at odds with one another, had taken an active interest in
the organization, so that it could demonstrate some success. However, as the
superpowers began to lose interest in the organization, they came to develop a
more tolerant attitude towards the nonresolution of conflict and the principle of
collective security weakened. Haas observed a lower rate ofUN success in conflict
resolution in the 1970s and concluded that the UN would continue to do poorly as
long as the superpowers maintained their indifference and chose not to get
involved or to cooperate to bring about the settlement of conflicts. 6
The fact that the UN was still able to have an impact on 24% of interstate
disputes in 1950-55
7
when superpower cooperation was at its lowest shows that
the UN’s success in conflict resolution is dependent upon many factors. Readiness
of the parties to use the UN, readiness of the parties to settle, readiness of a broad
coalition of the membership to see the UN get involved, absence of a veto by any
of the 5 permanent members of the UN and readiness by others to provide a lead
all contribute to success. However, superpower involvement and leadership is very
important, particularly in efforts involving massive peacekeeping presence,
because they can supply the UN with resources such as money, as well as political
and diplomatic backup.
In the early 1990s, the end of the ideological conflict between the East and
the West not surprisingly prompted many observers to assume that the UN would
6 Haas 234
7 Haas 220.
4
enjoy greater success. However, recent failures ofUN efforts suggest that the high
optimism of the 1990s was premature. By analyzing the experience of the 1990s as
systematically as Haas analyzed earlier UN efforts, I will show that the same
factors affecting UN success during the Cold War continue to operate today
g
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “Challenges of Preventive Diplomacy The Role of the United Nations and
its General Secretary,” Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start , ed Kevin M
Cahill, M D (New York: BasicBooks, 1996) 17
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY
To assess the success of the organization in the post Cold War period, I
employ the method used by Haas in his 1981 article. In his study Haas identified
282 disputes that had taken place between July 1945 and September 1981, ' and
determined that 123 of them had been on the agenda of the UN. He measured the
success of the organization in settling these disputes. First he determined whether
UN activity had made a difference in the disputes referred to it. Second, he
compared the end results of disputes handled through the UN and of disputes not
referred to the UN to see whether UN involvement affected the likelihood of
settlement. Furthermore, Haas looked at the 80 disputes
111
which had been referred
to the regional organizations and examined their efforts at resolving conflicts.
Haas used the same definition of a dispute, specifications of variables, and
coding procedures that he had created with Robert L. Butterworth and Joseph S.
Nye Jr., for an earlier study.
1
1
For Haas to consider a case as a “dispute'’ it had to
meet three conditions. First, there must be a definable issue at stake and not
merely general charges of “aggression,” “genocide,” or “intervention”. Second it
should involve clearly visible parties having specific claims on one another and
possessing a political organization, a military command structure, and a leadership
9 Haas 194
10 Haas 194.
11
Ernst B Haas, Robert L Butterworth and Joseph S. Nye Jr , Conflict Management by
International Organizations (Morristown, N.J General Learning Press, 1972)
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able to utilize both to implement whatever it agrees to do. Finally, the dispute
must be of an interstate character, with civil strife included only if at least one
side enjoyed the support of another government. 12
The dependent variable is the degree of success in dispute resolution. Haas
wrote that successful conflict management involves four aspects: “abatement”
“isolation,” “stopping hostilities” and “settlement.” He scored every dispute on
whether the organization had a great impact, whether it was somewhat successful
on each of the dimensions applicable to the dispute, or if no impact could be
determined. He assigned a 0 for no impact, 1 for some, and 2 for great impact to
each of the dimensions.
Haas regarded the organization as having great success in the first
dimension of abating the conflict if the hostilities slackened, disputants scaled
down rival claims, disputants initiated negotiations, or accepted third party
intercession. If some of these measures were adopted, then the organization was
seen to have met with limited success. If none of these measures were adopted by
the parties, then the organization was seen as having no impact.
1
'
Haas perceived success in stopping hostilities if the parties followed a
cease fire that had been ordered by the organization. If the cease fire was obeyed
sporadically, then the organization was seen as having limited success. It was
considered to have met with no success when the hostilities continued despite calls
for a ceasefire. If the organization had no opportunity to stop the hostilities
12
Haas, Butterworth, and Nye 4.
13 Haas 240.
7
because none had started, or they had already ended by the time the organization
was asked to get involved, then this dimension was marked “not applicable.” 14
Success in conflict isolation occurred if the organization was able to
prevent member states who had been asked to intervene from aiding one or both of
the parties. If some members obeyed, but others sided with one of the parties, then
it was seen as having met with limited success. In an instance where it was unable
to prevent any member states from getting involved in the conflict, it was rated as
having no success. In case the parties had no opportunity to seek aid, this
dimension was marked “not applicable.” 15
Success in conflict resolution was judged by Haas based on the degree of
compliance with the organization’s suggestions on substantive settlement of the
conflict. The organization was considered to have met with great success if the
final outcome reflected the content of the applicable resolutions. If some of the
intent of the resolution was followed by the parties, then it was seen as having had
limited success and when no part of the resolution was followed by the parties
involved, then it was seen as having had no success.
16
Haas then established an overall assessment of the dispute by adding the
scores on all the dimensions together. The actions of the organization were
classified as having no impact when the raw score was equal to a 0 indicating that
the action taken by the organization had made no difference to the outcome on any
dimension. It was classified as having limited impact when the added scores were
14 Haas 240
15 Haas 241
16
Haas 240.
8
1 or 2; such scores indicate that it had made some difference on at least one of the
dimensions. The organization’s role was classified as having had a great impact
when the raw scores ranged between 3 and 8. In these cases, the organization’s
actions either made some difference on three or four dimensions or made a great
difference on one dimension and at least some difference on one other. 1 ' Haas
defined failure as occurring when the dispute “remained unsettled,” “petered out
without resolution,” or the end result was the “victory of one party .”
Haas also sought to determine whether characteristics of a dispute affected
the prospects of settlement by coding disputes on various dimensions. The first of
these was intensity
ls
which was coded in terms of duration, the number of
fatalities, the chances that nuclear weapons might be used, and the likelihood of
escalation if any organization did not intervene. The next variable was extent of
warfare.
19
For this characteristic, each dispute was coded as having “none" if it
involved no armed hostilities, as being “skirmishes” where fighting was in the
form of clashes designed to frighten an antagonist, as being “limited military”
where the operations were a way of strengthening diplomatic claims and not about
conquering territory, and “military” where the operation was designed to defeat an
enemy and conquer its territory. A third variable was the spread"' of the dispute, or
whether it was bilateral, local, regional or global. A bilateral dispute involved only
two parties and a local dispute was one restricted to a particular area. A regional
17 Haas 241.
18 Haas 195.
19
In his study Haas labels this dimension “type of warfare” I have used the term “extent of warfare’
to prevent confusion between it and the first dimension “intensity’ of the dispute
20
Haas 197.
9
dispute arose when neighboring states were willing to enter the fighting and a
global dispute was one where states external to the region entered the conflict.
Another variable determined if the issues involved regarded Cold War conflicts or
decolonization.
21
The fifth variable was the alignment22 of the participants in the
Cold War divide while the sixth variable looked at the participants24 in the dispute
to see if they were great powers, regional powers or weak states.
Using Haas’ criteria, I have looked at the universe of international disputes
from January 1989 through December 1996, involving a clear issue, with clearly
visible parties and being of interstate character. I have not included cases that
involve issues like terrorism, as often in these instances the identity of the parties
are not clear and they are not of interstate character. 1 compiled a list of the cases
from 1989 until 1996 from “The New York Times Index- Years 1990 (Vol. 77) to
1996 (Vol. 84)” and “The Times Index- Years 1990 to 1996” I acquired further
information on these disputes by searching through the Lexis-Nexus information
system.
As I wanted to make a full comparison of Cold War with post Cold War
UN activity and success 1 also analyzed the disputes taking piace between
September 1981, the endpoint of Haas’ study, and December 1988. A later article
by Haas also covered the disputes in 1981- 1984,
24
identifying an additional 37
disputes. Thus Haas identified 319 disputes in 1945-84, of which 137 were
21
Haas 197.
22 Haas 197
23 Haas 197.
24
Ernst B Haas, Why We Still Need the United Nations: The Collective Management.of
International Conflict. 1945-1984 (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1986)9
10
referrals to the UN and 85 to the regional organizations. After examining data
which 1 had gathered on disputes occurring between 1985 to 1988, 1 found that
there had been a total of 346 disputes by the end of 1988, of which 142 had been
on the UN’s agenda and 89 on the agenda of the regional organizations.
To assess the UN s Post Cold War success, I first determined how many of
these more recent disputes were referred to the United Nations and then how far
the UN was successful in resolving them. My definitions of “success” and
failure are the same ones used by Haas. I have determined how many of the four
dimensions were applicable to each dispute and how successful the UN was in
each of those dimensions. Using the formula for calculating organizational success
developed by Haas, I have considered the UN to have met with no success in
instances where it has a raw score of 0, to have met with some success when the
raw score is 1 or 2, and to have met with great success when the raw score is 3 or
greater in conflicts where there was no fighting or no spread. In disputes involving
all four factors, the raw score had to be 6, 7 or 8 in order for it to be considered a
great success. I have also looked at the those disputes that were never referred to
the UN to see what their end result was. I have determined the success of the
regional organizations using the same method as that for the UN.
As I deal with post Cold War disputes I have not used Haas’ fourth and
fifth variables. The ones that I have focused on are intensity, warfare, spread, and
participants. In order to determine if the participants are great powers, weak states
ll
or regional powers, I have employed the Cox-Jacobson scale;> used by Haas which
uses five indicators to figure out the power of each country: gross national product,
gross national product per capita, population, nuclear capability, and prestige
My research shows that while the UN has had greater success in the post
Cold War period, there is a clear pattern indicating that it was more successful in
the period 1989-93 and that its rate of success has declined since 1994. The main
reason tor this change has been a reduction ofUS and Russian willingness and
ability to provide leadership in conflict resolution and their reluctance to get
involved in conflicts which do not affect their interests. This confirms Haas’
findings that UN success in conflict resolution is heavily dependent on collective
action by great powers and their commitment to prevent threats to peace.
25
Robert W Cox and Harold K Jacobson, The Anatomy of Influence. Decision making in
International Organizations (Forge Valley, MA: The Murray Printing Company, 1973) 437
CHAPTER 3
OVERALL PERFORMANCE OF THE UN
Security Council
In the penod between 1989 to 1996 there were 62 disputes. 26 30 or nearly
49% of them were referred to the United Nations. This is the second highest rate
of referral in the UN’s history, the highest being 57 percent in the period 1966 to
1970.
27
Ot the 32 disputes not referred to the UN, 5(16 percent of the nonreferred
cases) have been settled through mediation or negotiations. Another 4(12 percent
of the nonreferred cases) have petered out. Meanwhile 23 ( 72 percent of the
nonreferred disputes) have gone unresolved.
'
s
This is consistent with Haas’
findings that while in the early years of the Cold War up to 65 percent of the
nonreferred cases were resolved eventually, the proportion has fallen continuously
since I960.
29
According to Haas, the UN enjoyed its greatest Cold War era success from
1956 to 1960 when it achieved partial or great success in resolving 40 percent of
the disputes referred to it.
3
" The rate of success rose much higher in the post Cold
26
I have not counted as disputes instances where the UN dealt with a conflict primarily by taking
measures under Chapter VII of the Charter The 3 post Cold War conflicts which were mainly dealt
with under Chapter VII are the Gulf War, the sanctions imposed on Sudan, and the sanctions
imposed on Libya I have, however, looked at Libya’s case against Britain and the US before the
ICJ
27
Haas 196
28
Tables A 1 to A.10 in the Appendix contain the data which I have used to determine the
performance of the UN and regional organizations
29
Haas 206.
30
Haas 226
13
war years with the UN showing at least partial success in 29 out of the 30 cases
referred to it since 1 989. The UN's success over the years can be seen in Table
3.1.
Table 3.1- Cases where the UN showed Limited or Great Success between 1945-
1996.
Years Number Percentage
1945-50 7 out of 20 33%
1951-55 3 out of 1
2
25%
1956-60 6 out of 1
6
40%
1961-65 5 out of 26 19%
1966-70 3 out of 1
4
24%
1971-75 2 out of 1 17%
1976-80 4 out of 24 17%
1981-84 2 out of 1
3
18%
1985-88 1 out of 5 20%
1989-96 29 out of 30 97%
Since 1989 the UN displayed great success in resolving 5 of the 30
conflicts that were on its agenda: the civil war in Cambodia, the civil war in El
Salvador, the civil war in Mozambique, the conflict over the Aouzou strip and the
14
conflict between Greece and Macedonia over the latter’s name. In every other case
except one, the UN had limited success. The exception was the dispute involving
the US invasion ot Panama, on which the UN could take no action because of
vetoes by the US and its allies in the Security Council. Therefore the UN had great
success in resolving 17% of the disputes that were referred to it and had limited
success in another 80% of them. The proportion of disputes where the UN had
great success and limited success was much higher in this period than during any
other era of the organization.
Dividing conflict resolution into its four aspects in Table 3.2 shows that
during the 1989-96 period the UN was most successful in abating conflicts and
least successful in stopping hostilities.
Table 3.2- Rate of Success in the Four Fields between 1989-1996.
Cases Referred Success Success percentage
Abatement 30 28 93
Isolation 24 14 58
Stopping hostilities 18 5 28
Settlement 30 14 47
15
The UN’s success was also strong across disputes with differing
characteristics as seen in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3- UN Success and Variables between 1989-1996.
Great success Some success No success
High 16% 84% -
Moderate 17% 66% 17%
Low 20% 80% -
Spread
Global - 100% -
Regional 8% 92% -
Bilateral 33% 58% 8%
Extent of Warfare :
Military 17% 78% 5%
Limited military - 100% -
Skirmish 17% 83% -
None 25% 75% -
Power of parties :
Superpower 10% 80% 10%
Large power - 100% -
Middle power 29% 71% -
Smaller power 40% 60% -
Smallest power - 100% -
16
The post Cold War increase in UN success is even more striking when the
characteristics of the disputes referred to it are compared to those of disputes not
referred. More conflicts involving higher levels of intensity, warfare, spread, and
superpowers or large parties were referred to the UN in the Post Cold War era than
before as seen in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4- Rate of referral to the UN by Characteristics of the dispute between
1945-1996.
1945-1988 1989-1996
Number Percentage Number Percentage
High intensity 45 out of 142 32 20 out of 22 91
High Warfare 34 out of 142 24 1 8 out of 22 82
Reg / Global spread 25 out of 142 18 1 8 out of 22 82
Super/ Large parties 74 out of 142 52 14 out of 26 54
The continuing importance of member state political leadership is revealed
in the patterns of dispute resolution. In the 19 conflicts the UN helped resolve in
1989-96, it was successful in settling the conflict over the Aouzou strip and the
conflict between Greece and Macedonia, only 2 of the 1 9 disputes, without the aid
of a nation or another organization. In every other case where the dispute was
17
resolved, the UN collaborated with either other international organizations or
nations. Within a short time after the end of the Cold War, the United States and
the Soviet Union or Russia worked with the UN to end several disputes which they
had largely been involved in during the years of the Cold War. In the civil war in
El Salvador, the US and Soviet Union gave support to the peace plan which
ultimately led to the end of the conflict there. Namibia was another case where
progress was made through US and Soviet cooperation. Recently the civil war in
Angola was brought to an end with the help of the US, Russia and Portugal. The
UN and the presidents of five Central American nations worked together to end
the civil war in Nicaragua. Meanwhile the civil war in Mozambique ended when
the Italian government assisted the UN. The French government worked with the
Secretary General in mediating the conflict between Eritrea and Yemen over the
Hanish islands. The situation in Haiti improved with the involvement of the UN,
the US and the OAS.
The US appears to have been the most effective party in helping resolve
disputes. It seems to have made progress in several instances where the UN was
not making any headway in getting the various parties to a come to a resolution.
This was apparent in the Arab-Israeli conflict when through US efforts and
mediation by Norwegian diplomats, the Israel-PLO accords were signed. In
bringing this conflict closer to an end, the UN played only a marginal role. In the
case of the former Yugoslavia, where the UN was unsuccessful in resolving the
18
conflict, the US and NATO forces eventually forced the parties to settle the issue.
US actions also averted North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT.
An examination of the disputes that the UN attempted to resolve between
1989 and 1996 shows that the organization was more effective prior to 1994. It
settled three high intensity conflicts involving military warfare during 1989 and
1993. In 1994-1996, it showed more modest results, with great success in only two
disputes that were not of high intensity and did not involve much warfare. It
appears that the support and backing provided by the two superpowers was an
important reason for the earlier success of the UN. Even in cases where the UN
was given most of the credit for the resolution of the conflict, there was
superpower involvement
.
Russia, the Soviet Union’s successor in the UN, seems to be plagued with
too many domestic problems to become actively involved in efforts to end
international conflicts. Therefore, the burden of making diplomatic efforts and
providing troops seems to have fallen largely on the US as it is effectively the only
superpower. In situations where the US has taken major initiatives to solve the
conflict, as in the cases of the Haiti and North Korea, the conflicts have been
resolved. Meanwhile in other instances where the US has chosen not to play a
major role, such as East Timor and Afghanistan, the conflicts remain unresolved.
In this more recent period, the US has become reluctant to get involved in
conflicts which do not affect its interests. Meanwhile Russia remains in a position
that keeps it from doing much on the international scene. Therefore with an end of
19
the joint efforts and commitment of these two nations to solve worldwide
conflicts, the UN no longer has the backing which it had in the early years of the
Post Cold War era to settle disputes.
The International Court of Justice
In his 1981 study Haas also looked at the judgments of the International
Court of Justice in cases of a political nature. Haas considered those cases to be of
a political nature which dealt with disputes that were also on the political agenda
of the five international organizations: the UN, the OAS, the OAU, the Arab
League and the Council of Europe. He found only 3 of 12 such judgments had
been implemented. Judgments had been implemented in the Haya de la Torre
asylum, Honduras-Nicaraguan border and the Temple of Preah Vihear cases. The
nonimplemented judgments had been in the cases of the Corfu Channel, first
Southwest Africa, Anglo-Iraman Oil Company, Portuguese Colonies in India, UN
peacekeeping expenses, third Southwest Africa, Icelandic fisheries. Western
Sahara and Iranian hostages. Haas found that since 1962, no decision of a political
nature had been implemented and that there was a sense that the Court was failing
in its task ofjudicial settlement.' 1
In the period from 1981 to 1988, three cases of a political nature were
decided by the ICJ: Malta vs. Libya over their maritime boundary, Burkina Faso
vs. Mali over their land boundary and Nicaragua vs. the US over mining of
Nicaragua’s harbors. The Id's decision was implemented in the disputes between
M
Haas, Butterworth, and Nye 4
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Libya and Malta and Burkina Faso and Mali. However, the US refused to abide by
the Court's decision in favor of Nicaragua. Thus by the end of the Cold War
period, the ICJ had made a decision in 15 cases of political nature. 5 of these had
been implemented, bringing the ICJ’s rate of success to 33%.
In the post Cold War years, the ICJ has looked at 8 cases of the political
kind. The Court has yet to decide on 4 of these: Libya vs. United Kingdom and
United States over the aerial incident at Lockerbie, Cameroon vs. Nigeria on land
and maritime boundaries, Qatar vs. Bahrain on maritime delimitation, and Bosnia
and Herzegovina vs. Yugoslavia over the issue of genocide. Another 2 were settled
out of court: the Nicaragua vs. Honduras case over the latter’s support to contras
and the maritime delimitation case between Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. In the
remaining 2 cases, the maritime and frontier case between El Salvador and
Honduras, and the territorial dispute over the Aouzou Strip between Chad and
Libya, the court’s decision was implemented by both sides. The relatively high
proportion of still undecided cases means it is too early to say if a greater number
of decisions of a political nature made by the ICJ will be implemented in the Post
Cold War period. However, implementation of even one ruling in the pending
cases will show an increased level of success by the ICJ.
Regional Organizations and the UN
In his study Haas looked at the performance of regional organizations in
resolving disputes. He observed that prior to 1965, disputes referred to regional
organizations were different from those referred to the UN and typically of low
21
intensity, involving minimal fighting and small powers. 32 The regional
organizations were often not successful in resolving these disputes. However, in
the period after 1965, the disputes referred to the regional organizations were
similar to those which were referred to the UN and the organizations became
competitors for the same task. 33
According to Haas the regional organizations did not prove to be a better
forum for settling disputes than the UN, though the reasons were different in each
region. The Organization of American States became increasingly ineffective in
settling conflict after 1965, prior to which the US had been a leader in the
organization. However, as more left-leaning governments came to power in Latin
America and the leadership ot the US was challenged, deep divisions arose
between the OAS’ members and the success of the organization began to
decline.
34
The Arab League performed poorly in the 1950s when Egypt tried to
exercise hegemonic influence, but was challenged by Iraq. This often lead to
factions forming around the two leaders, which made the League ineffective in
resolving disputes. Later on Saudi Arabia became more involved with the
organization and financed its operations and made diplomatic efforts, as a result of
which the Arab League improved its rate of success modestly during the 1960s.
However, success in the Arab League depended on which nation was providing
leadership to the organization during a certain period and whether other members
32
Haas 215.
33 Haas 216.
34
Haas 212
22
ot the League supported its initiative. Meanwhile the Organization of African
Unity improved its performance slightly with more effective mediation by the
Secretary General and heads ot states. However, it was incapable of mounting and
financing operations on its own and its success was often dependent on
extraregional actors.
6
Haas concluded that the “aggregate success scored by most
international organizations in managing conflicts has declined steadily after
1970.” 37
In the post Cold War years, the regional organizations have shown some
success in 6 out of the 10 disputes which came before them. In 5 out of those 6
disputes, they worked with the UN. The OAS showed some success in each of the
two disputes, involving Haiti and Nicaragua, which were referred to it and it
collaborated with the UN in settling both these disputes. The OAU showed some
success in 3 out of 5 or 60% of the disputes which were referred to it. In 2 out of
those 3 disputes, involving the Aouzou Strip and Western Sahara, it worked with
the UN. Meanwhile the Arab League displayed some success in 1 out of the 3 or
33% of the conflicts referred to it. This was the dispute in Lebanon, in which the
UN also played a role.
In the post Cold War period, collaboration between the UN and a regional
organization has often led to some success. The example of the Aouzou Strip,
shows how different organizations can together produce a very successful result.
This twenty-one year old border dispute between Libya and Chad was successfully
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resolved in 1994, following a cease-fire negotiated under the auspices of the OAU.
a judgment by the International Court of Justice, and a small peace-keeping
operation by the UN assisting the two nations in implementing the judgment of the
ICJ.
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CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION
Following the end of the Cold War in 1989, the United Nations did become
more successful at conflict resolution. Almost halt of the disputes which occurred
in the post Cold War period made it to the UN Security Council’s agenda. The
49% rate of referral is the second highest in the UN’s history, and a large increase
over the rate of referral prevailing in the late 1970s and early 1980s. More nations
were taking their disputes to the UN at a time when the conflict between the
superpowers had decreased.
Additionally, the disputes referred were more significant in terms of
potential harm because they involved higher levels of intensity, more warfare,
greater potential for spread and more powerful parties. In the period from 1989-96,
91% of the disputes with high intensity were referred to the UN as opposed to 32%
in the Cold War years. In terms of warfare, 82% of the disputes involving high
military operations were referred to the organization as compared to 24% in the
Cold War period. While only 1 8% of the disputes with regional or global spread
were referred to the organization in the period prior to 1989, 82% of these kind of
disputes were referred to it in the period following the end of the Cold War. In the
Cold War years 52% of the cases involving superpowers and large powers were
referred to the UN, and this rose to 54% in the post Cold War years.
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In the absence of vetoes by the United States and Russia, the UN was able
to show some success in almost all the disputes that were referred to it. The one
instance where it could take no action, in the US invasion of Panama, was the only
one where a veto was cast. There was an improvement over its performance during
the years ot the Cold War. The organization showed 93% rate of success in
abating conflicts, 58% in isolating them, 28% in stopping hostilities and 47% in
settling them. While in the Cold War years its highest rate of success had been at
40%, this has increased to 97% in the post Cold War period. A closer look at the
Security Council’s record shows that it was more successful in resolving disputes
from 1989-1993. In the period following that its rate of success appears to have
declined.
The greater Security Council success in 1989-1993 reflected increased
cooperation between the superpowers and a commitment to end conflicts. The US
and Russia were actively involved in assisting the UN in resolving disputes. They
acted as mediators in helping to end disputes in nations such as Namibia, where
they had been carrying on a proxy war, and giving aid to opposing sides during the
years of the Cold War. While the UN had the support of both superpowers in its
efforts to end conflicts, it was able to accomplish a great deal. It was able to settle
three high intensity conflicts which had been going on for many years. Out of
those three conflicts in Cambodia, El Salvador and Mozambique, the first two
came to an end only after the United States and Russia played a role in the
peacemaking process. Furthermore the US and Russia made attempts not to hinder
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the process of settling conflicts. This was demonstrated by a lack of vetoes in this
period and also by the efforts of the superpowers to end their involvement in
conflicts where they had been supporting opposing sides. Even in conflicts where
the two superpowers did not take initiative, the improved political climate meant
that the UN also got assistance from other intergovernmental organizations, ad hoc
regional groupings or individual governments. For example, the civil war in
Nicaragua came to an end with the joint efforts of the UN and the presidents of
Central American countries. The Italian government worked with the UN in
ending the civil war in Mozambique.
The Security Council’s performance in settling disputes declined in 1994-
1996. It was able to show great success in settling two conflicts: one regarding the
Aouzou Strip and the other over Macedonia’s name. Yet neither of these was of
high intensity, nor did they involve large scale military operations. Meanwhile
some high intensity conflicts, such as those in Afghanistan, which seemed to be on
the verge of being resolved immediately following the end of the Cold War,
continued.
Even in this period there was an absence of ideological conflict or other
serious competition between the superpowers, which could have prevented them
from getting involved in UN efforts. However, by this time Russia had too many
domestic problems to be able to devote efforts to resolve international conflicts. It
was also not in a position to contribute troops and finances to the peacekeeping
operations. It now fell upon the US, the sole superpower, to make diplomatic
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efforts to solve conflicts. The US did become involved in disputes such as those in
Haiti or over North Korea’s noncomphance with International Atomic Energy
Agency, but that was only because involvement served its direct and immediate
interests. Other high intensity conflicts such as East Timor where the US has
chosen not to get involved are also the ones where the UN has failed to bring an
end to the dispute.
The US, which now seems to be the most effective agent in settling
disputes, has increasingly distanced itself from the UN and has either made
independent diplomatic efforts or worked with other groups or nations. In trying to
resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US has worked alongside Norwegian
diplomats. Meanwhile in the dispute between Russia and the Baltic states, Russia
agreed to withdraw its troops from the Baltic states through US mediation.
With the lack of strong American leadership in the UN and an end of
diplomatic efforts by Russia, the organization must now rely more heavily on other
nations and organizations. For example, in the conflict in Rwanda and Burundi,
the UN had to rely extensively on French forces to provide food and protection to
the large refugee population. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the conflict
seemed to be too complex and intense for the UN to handle on its own and the
situation improved only after the involvement ofNATO forces. In instances where
the leadership and efforts from a nation or organization has ceased, as in the case
of Somalia, the UN has had no choice but to end its efforts to resolve the dispute.
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Since the end ot the Cold War, a greater number of nations have been
taking their disputes to the International Court of Justice and therefore it has
become more prominent than it was during the Cold War years. In the period after
1989, the Court has examined 8 cases of political nature. So far the Court has
rendered its decision in two cases, one involving maritime and frontier boundary
between El Salvador and Honduras, and the other a territorial dispute between
Libya and Chad. Each of these decisions was implemented by the parties involved
in the dispute.
It remains to be seen whether the ICJ’s decisions will be implemented
more in the Post Cold War era. That can only be determined once the ICJ makes a
decision in the 4 cases (the other 2 were settled out of court) of political nature
which are still before it.
Following the end of the Cold War, the UN and regional organizations
have worked together to resolve several disputes and this has resulted in an
increase in the rate of success. A high intensity conflict such as the civil war in
Nicaragua, was resolved only with the joint efforts of the UN, the OAS and the
Contadora group. There is a great deal of potential for the UN and regional
organizations to bring an end to conflicts as long as they develop methods and
procedures to combine their resources for maximum results. Their success in the
future will depend on better mutual understanding of the possibilities and limits
between the UN and the regional organizations, leading to a more effective
division of labor as each organization takes leadership where it can be the more
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effective, and accountability ot the various organizations involved in managing a
conflict to the United Nations Security Council. 39
This study confirms the earlier observations that the UN enjoys more
success in its function of dispute resolution when great powers become involved in
the organization and work collectively to resolve conflicts. The increased
superpower involvement strengthens the collective security mechanism and the
organization becomes revitalized in its task of resolving conflicts. This was
displayed in the years immediately after the end of the Cold War, when the UN’s
rate of success increased and more nations began to refer their disputes to the
organization, as it was perceived that with great power unanimity and leadership
the UN would take collective measures and be committed to resolving conflicts
and addressing any threats to peace. However, as the powerful nations became
reluctant to get involved in conflicts which did not affect their interest in the post
1993 period, the success of the organization has declined and it again appears that
the members of the UN are developing a tolerant attitude to conflicts.
The organization works best when it has the active support of powerful
nations as it is a meeting place for nations of the world to work together and take
action under the guidelines of the Charter in order to settle conflicts. The world
has not attained any fully suprenational form of governance. Multilateral efforts
still require the engagement and interest of those states with the greatest
capability. What the post Cold War era shows is an additional step on the way to a
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more fully multilateralist form of governance as John Ruggie defines it in
Multilateralism Matters - one where there is a joint decision according to
general rules applied evenhandedly to all. Great power discretion has not fully
disappeared, but using the UN- even the Security Council- subjects them to the
eyes and comments ot other states and forces the great powers to explain
themselves and pushes them towards greater conformity with the charter norms.
In concluding his analysis of the UN’s performance in the Cold War years,
Haas wrote that the organization’s performance would continue to decline as long
as the great powers did not get involved in conflicts or exercised leadership and
took action only when their direct interests were involved. This same pattern has
persisted in the post Cold War period. As long as it continues, the UN’s rate of
success in conflict resolution will remain lower than it was in 1990-93.
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APPENDIX
DATA TABLES
Table A. 1- Ratings of Security Council’s performance on the disputes referred to it
between 1989-1996.
Dispute Abating
conflict
Stopping
hostilities
Isolating
conflict
Settling
conflict
Raw Score Success
1 ) Panama invasion 0 0 0 0 0 None
2) Falkland Islands 1 NA NA 1 2 Some
3) Nicaragua 1 1 1 1 4 Some
4) Namibia 1 2 0 1 4 Some
5) Lebanon 1 0 0 0 1 Some
6) Iran-Iraq war 1 1 NA 0 2 Some
7) El Salvador 1 2 1 1 5 Great
8) Cambodia 2 1 1 1 5 Great
9) Arab-Israeli 1 0 NA 0 1 Some
10) Mozambique 1 2 0 2 5 Great
1 1 ) Aouzou Strip 2 0 NA 2 4 Great
1 2) Rwanda, Burundi 1 0 0 1 2 Some
13) Russian Troops
in Baltic
1 NA NA 0 1 Some
14) Haiti I 1 0 1 3 Some
1 5) North Korea 1 NA NA 0 1 Some
16) Angola 1 1 0 1 3 Some
1 7) Greece & Macedonia 2 NA NA 1 3 Great
18) Former Yugoslavia 1 0 1 0 2 Some
19) Guatemala 1 2 0 1 4 Some
20) Afghanistan 1 0 1 1 3 Some
21) Cyprus 1 NA 0 0 1 Some
22) Somalia 1 0 0 0 1 Some
23) East Timor 1 NA NA 0 1 Some
24) Western Sahara 1 1 0 0 2 Some
25) Tajikstan 1 1 0 0 2 Some
26) Liberia 1 0 0 0 1 Some
27) Kashmir 0 1 NA 0 1 Some
28) Kurd homeland 1 1 NA 0 2 Some
29) Hanish islands 1 0 NA 1 2 Some
30) Nagamo-Karabakh 1 1 NA 0 2 Some
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Performance in the individual cases
The -?0 disputes have been on the United Nations Security Council s
agenda in the post Cold War period. The cases are arranged in Table 1 based on
when they were resolved. At the end of the list are those disputes which still
continue.
1 ) In the invasion of Panama by the US, I am giving the UN a rating of 0 in
the field of abating the conflict as well as in stopping the hostilities. It was thought
that this invasion would have a negative impact on the peace talks that were going
on in Nicaragua, but it did not affect that process. However, the UN played no role
here so I am giving it no points in isolating the conflict. As the UN could take no
action towards settling the conflict due to a veto by US, France and Britain in the
Security Council, I am giving it a 0 in this field.
2) In the Falkland Islands dispute where Britain and Argentina continued to
claim the island, even though Argentina had lost the war, I am giving the UN a
score of 1 in abating the conflict as it was able to bring the two parties to negotiate
and try to discuss the issue in a peaceful way. Although the two sides did not
resolve their dispute, through these talks they resumed diplomatic relations for the
first time in 1990 since the Falkland War. Therefore I am giving the UN a score of
1 in the field of conflict settlement.
3) In the Nicaraguan civil war, I gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the
conflict as its efforts along with those of 5 Central American Presidents led to
negotiations between the contras and the government. I gave it a 1 in its efforts to
end hostilities as after the 1990 elections there had been renewed fighting by some
rebel forces. I gave it a score of 1 in isolating the conflict because even though
Honduras ended its support for the contras, the US continued to provide aid to
them. Finally I gave it a score of 1 in settling the conflict as it helped to monitor
elections and the demobilization of contras, but despite these measures there was
still some civil strife in the nation.
4) The UN was given a score of 1 in abating the conflict in Namibia as it was
able to get all the parties involved to end hostilities and start negotiations that
ultimately would lead to the independence of Namibia. However, the situation in
Namibia improved only with American and Soviet cooperation. The UN was able
to supervise a cease fire and so I am giving it a score of 2 in this field. Diplomatic
initiatives taken by the US led to the withdrawal of South African forces from
Namibia and Cuban forces from Angola. Therefore 1 am giving the organization
no points in isolating the conflict. Finally the UN was able to monitor the cease
fire, and assist in voter registration. Due to its efforts and an end of the Cold War,
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elections took place and Namibia became an independent state in 1990. Therefore
I am giving the UN a score of 1 in settling the conflict.
5) I have given the UN a score of 1 in abating the conflict in Lebanon, as the
UNIFIL forces have provided humanitarian assistance, prevented Israel from
turning South Lebanon into Israel-occupied territory and have given Israel security
from infiltration from the south of Lebanon. The UN has, however, not been able
to prevent the sides from fighting and so I am giving it a 0 in the field of stopping
hostilities. Also it has failed to isolate the conflict and Israel and Syria continue to
be involved in the affairs of Lebanon. So I am giving the organization a score of 0
in isolating the conflict. Finally I am giving the UN a 0 in the field of settling the
conflict as it seems to have played almost no role in improving the situation in
Lebanon. The civil war in that nation appears to have halted due to mediation by
Arab nations.
6) The UN was given a score of 1 in abating the conflict in the Iran-Iraq war
as it was able to get the two parties to stop hostilities and negotiate. 1 gave the UN
a score of 2 in the category of stopping hostilities as it made the two sides agree to
a permanent cease fire. Finally the UN was given a 0 in its efforts at settling the
conflict because although it had been successful in establishing a cease fire and
getting the two sides to negotiate, neither of the parties was agreeing to give up its
claims. This led to a situation of “no peace, no war" and the UN did not seem to
be able to settle the conflict.
7) The UN received a rating of 1 in abating the civil war in El Salvador as the
government and the FMLN agreed to suspend hostilities, scale down rival claims
and initiate negotiations under UN auspices. However, this process was successful
largely because the US and the Soviet Union backed the peace plan. The UN was
given a score of 2 in stopping hostilities as both sides agreed to a cease fire. The
US that had been supporting one of the sides in the civil war, ended that support
through UN efforts and assisted both sides in reaching a solution. So I gave it a
score of 1 in the field of conflict isolation. Finally I gave the UN a score of 1 in
conflict settlement as it supervised the cease fire and the demobilization of the
guerrillas and their integration in civil life with assistance from the two
superpowers. The UN mediation resulted in elections in 1994 which led to an end
to the civil war.
8) In the Cambodian civil war, I gave the UN a score of 2 in abating the
conflict as the organization was able to bring all 4 factions and the government to
agree to UN assistance with elections and rebuilding of the nation. The
organization was given a rating of 1 in the field of ending hostilities as it was able
to lessen the fighting between the government and some opposition groups.
However, the violence continued due to the Khmer Rouge's unwillingness to obey
the cease fire. Although the third party, Vietnam, did withdraw its forces from
Cambodia this was not done under UN supervision. Vietnam's withdrawal was
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11) In the case of the Aouzou Strip, I gave the UN a rating of 2 in abating the
conflict as it send a force contributed by 6 nations to observe the withdrawal of
Libyan forces from the region, following the decision made by the International
Court of Justice m Chad’s favor. I gave it no points for ending hostilities as a cease
tire had come into effect in 1987 as a result of mediation by the OAU. The UN
received a score of 2 in settling the conflict because in a period of two months the
agreement was implemented and the mission was over.
12) 1 gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the situation in Rwanda and Burundi,
because French forces under its auspices provided food, supplies and protection to
thousands of Hutus. I gave it a 0 in ending hostilities because the Security
Council’s demands for a cease fire were not followed. The fighting ended with the
victory of the Rwandan Patriotic Forces. The UN received no points for isolating
the conflict because neighboring countries provided support to different parties
involved in the fighting. I gave the UN a score of 1 in settling the conflict as it had
set up a Criminal Tribunal and UNAMIR forces are resettling refugees and
monitoring human rights. However, many refugees are still in neighboring nations.
13) The Baltic States asked the UN to take action to facilitate the withdrawal
of Russian troops from their territory. The Secretary General appointed a special
representative who assisted the two sides in negotiations. Therefore I have given
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the UN a rating of 1 in abating the conflict. The issue was finally settled with the
mediation of the United States and so 1 have given the organization no points for
settling the dispute.
14) I gave the UN a 1 in abating the conflict on Haiti because it started
negotiations between the two sides and send a civil mission to monitor human
rights. However the US and the OAS were also involved in the process. The
organization received a rating of 1 in stopping hostilities as political violence
continued in several parts of the country. The UN received no points for isolatine
the conflict as it allowed a US led invasion of the country under Resolution 940.
The US government proceeded to make an agreement with Haiti’s military
leaders, which led to the return of the exiled President, without consulting the UN
or the OAS. The UN assisted in settling the conflict by monitoring human rights
and paving the way for elections. Therefore I have given it a score of 1 in this
field.
15) I have given the UN a score of 1 in abating the tensions that arose when
North Korea refused to let the IAEA examine its nuclear sites and threatened to
withdraw from the NPT. Several UN members such as China were not in favor of
imposing economic sanctions on North Korea so the Security Council members
were urged to negotiate with North Korea. The issue was settled through bilateral
talks between the US and North Korea, as a result of which the latter agreed to
suspend its withdrawal from the NPT and to permit IAEA inspections. As the UN
piayed no role in negotiating a settlement, I have given it no points.
16) In the Angola civil war, I have given the UN a rating of 1 in abating the
conflict, as the Security Council voted to place an embargo on military and
petroleum products to the areas held by UNITA and also threatened to take other
sanctions unless UNITA agreed to the Lusaka Protocol that ended the conflict.
However, the discussion and the final peace plan were carried out through the
work of US, Russia and Portugal. 1 gave it a rating of 1 in stopping hostilities as
there had been violations of the cease fire on several occasions. The UN received
no points for removing third parties from this conflict, as the withdrawal of Cuban
troops in 1988, had come about due to diplomatic efforts by the United States.
Through UN and US efforts, UNITA accepted the MPLA government and its
leader became one of the vice-presidents of the country. Therefore I am giving the
UN a score of 1 in this area.
1 7) In the dispute between Greece and Macedonia, I have given the UN a score
of 2 in abating the conflict because it has gotten the two sides to negotiate. I gave a
score of 1 to the organization in settling the conflict as it was successful in making
Greece lift its economic embargo of Macedonia in 1995. Currently negotiations
are going on over the issue of Greece’s objection to Macedonia’s name.
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18) In the case of the former Yugoslavia I gave the UN a 1 in its efforts of
abating the crisis as it was able to provide humanitarian assistance to the region. I
gave it no points in stopping hostilities as numerous cease fires were not obeyed
and the fighting ended only with the bombardment by NATO forces. Although the
fighting started in Croatia it soon spread throughout the region and the UN was
unable to control it. However, it did employ a force on the border of Macedonia to
prevent the ethnic conflict from extending there and so I have given it a score of 1
in isolating the conflict. In the area of settling the conflict I gave it a rating of 0 as
the Dayton accords that ended the conflict were a result of American diplomacy.
19) In the case of the civil war in Guatemala, I gave the UN a rating of 1 in its
efforts to abate the conflict because it got the two sides to negotiate over a period
of 6 years and it provided advisory service through an independent expert. After
the negotiations a cease fire was accepted by both parties and therefore I have
given the UN a 2 in its efforts to stopping hostilities. 1 gave the UN no points in
isolating the conflict because the US which had been supporting the government,
ended that support due to domestic pressure over human rights violations in the
nation and not through any UN initiative. I gave the UN a 1 in settling the conflict
as even though it assisted in deliberations and in monitoring human rights, it failed
to send military observers to monitor the peace accord after China vetoed that
proposal.
20) 1 have given the UN a rating of 1 for abating the conflict in Afghanistan as
efforts by the organization led to the Geneva Accords of 1988. Under these
accords, the Soviet Union was to withdraw from Afghanistan and other nations
were to end their interference in the civil war in that country. I have given a score
of 0 to the UN in its efforts of stopping hostilities as even after the Soviet
withdrawal the war continued between the different Afghan factions. I gave the
UN a rating of 1 in the category of conflict isolation as it was successful in
facilitating Soviet troop withdrawal. However, the US, Pakistan and the Soviet
Union continued to provide support to the government and opposition forces. I
gave a score of 1 to the UN in the area of settlement of the conflict, since it was
able to get the Soviet forces to withdraw but the fighting went on among the
Afghan factions leading to wide scale destruction and death.
21 ) I gave the UN a 1 in abating the conflict in Cyprus as the Secretary General
was able to get the leaders of the Greek and Turkish sides to have discussions in
1988. The UN’s efforts in isolating the conflict were given a 0 as Turkey and
Greece continued to support the rival factions on Cyprus. The UN was given a 0 in
settling the conflict because the issue has been on its agenda for more than 30
years but neither of the sides seem to want a permanent peace and the dispute
between them continues.
22) I gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the food shortages in Somalia amidst
heavy clan warfare. The UN was able to provide humanitarian assistance that
37
prevented a famine. I gave it a rating of 0 in stopping hostilities as none of the
cease fires held for long and there was a great deal of fighting. I gave it a score of
0 in isolating the conflict because it permitted US forces to intervene in the
country under resolution 794. The US forces that had come under “Operation
Restore Hope” took military initiatives without consulting the UN officials. The
UN was given a rating of 0 in conflict settlement as it could not bring about
national reconciliation and the country remained in a state of chaos.
23) 1 gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the conflict in East Timor as it got
Portugal and Indonesia to discuss the conflict in 1989. However, there was no
follow up to that and a visit by the Portuguese administration to East Timor on a
fact finding mission was canceled in 1991
.
Sol have given the UN a rating of 0 in
settling the conflict as there has been no change in that situation.
24) I gave the UN a score of 1 in abating the Western Sahara conflict as it was
able to get the POLISARIO and the Moroccan King to start a dialogue and agree to
a referendum. The UN was given a rating of 1 in the field of stopping hostilities
because due to its efforts the two sides accepted a temporary cease fire. The UN
was unsuccessful in isolating the conflict and therefore was given a score of 0.
Algeria did cease supporting the POLISARIO but that was due to its
rapprochement with Morocco. The UN was given a 0 in resolving the conflict as
the referendum never took place and the POLISARIO eventually backed out of the
negotiations.
25) I am giving a score of 1 to the UN’s efforts in abating the civil war in
Tajikstan. The UN was successful in bringing the two sides to start negotiations
and lessen hostilities. The UN sent forces to monitor the cease fire, but there have
been many violations of the cease fire and so I am giving the organization a 1 in
the field of stopping hostilities. The UN has been unsuccessful in preventing
countries like Afghanistan and Iran from supporting the Islamic rebels and so I am
giving it a rating of 0 in isolating the conflict. The conflict continues as the
violence persists and the sided do not seem willing to come to an agreement. So I
am giving the UN a 0 in settling the conflict.
26) The UN was given a score of 1 in abating the Liberian civil war, because
its special envoy assisted the ECOWAS group in starting the negotiations between
the various factions. I gave the UN a score of 0 in ending the hostilities as the
cease fires were followed rarely. The UN received a score of 0 in isolating the
conflict as the ECOWAS nations interfered in the civil war in Liberia while the
UN supported their actions. Although plans were made for a transitional
government and subsequent elections these never materialized as fighting spread
throughout the nation and so the UN received a score of 0 in settling the conflict.
27) In the case of Kashmir, the UN has had no effect in abating the conflict and
tensions have increased between India and Pakistan in recent years. So I have
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given it a score of 0 in this field. The cease fire has been broken on several
occasions and so I have given the UN a 1 in its efforts to end hostilities. Finally no
settlement seems to be near and India has stopped cooperating with the UN since
1972 and has restricted the organization’s activities. So I have given the UN a 0 in
settling the conflict.
28) In the situation where the Kurds have demanded a homeland, the UN gave
support to the US operation ‘‘Provide Comfort” to give the Kurds a safe haven. So
I have given it a score of 1 in this area. I have given the UN a 1 in its efforts to
stop hostilities, because even though the Kurds are safe from Iraq, they have been
attacked by Turkey and there is infighting amongst them. I have given it no points
to the UN in determining a permanent homeland for the Kurds as Turkey is
opposed to a Kurd region in Northern Iraq.
29) I have given the UN a score of 1 in abating the conflict over the Hanish
islands as the Secretary General offered his good offices to Eritrea and Yemen and
urged France to mediate. After a round of fighting over the Greater Hanish islands,
the two sides agreed to a cease fire amongst themselves and exchanged prisoners
of war. The UN did not play a role in ending hostilities, so I have given it no
points. The two nations agreed to settle the issue peacefully and submit it to the
International Court of Justice, as a result of mediation by France, Egypt, Ethiopia
and the UN. So I am giving the organization a score of 1 in settling the conflict.
30) I have given a score of 1 to the UN in abating the conflict in Nagamo-
Karabagh as it has assisted the OSCE in starting negotiations between Armenia
and Azerbaijan and has provided humanitarian assistance. The UN has received a
1 in ending hostilities as a fragile cease fire has been in effect since 1994. I gave
the organization a 0 in settling the conflict as no agreement appears to be
forthcoming.
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Table A. 2- Outcome of disputes not referred to the UN between 1989-1996.
Dispute
Sudan civil war
Sri Lanka civil war
Dispute over 3 islands
Dispute over Sabah
Senegal/ Mauritania border
Treatment of Turks in Bulgaria
Fishing in Barents Sea
Sprately islands
Walvis Bay
Sudan/ Egypt border
Ecuador/ Peru border
Russia/ Latvia border
Russia/ Estonia border
Latvia/ Lithuania
maritime border
Siachen Glacier
Kurile island
Senkaku Island
Ukraine/ Romania border
Treatment of Hungarians
in Slovakia
Black Sea Fleet
Ukraine’s nuclear weapons
Nepalese refugees
Treatment of Turks in Greece
Greece extending its
territory in Aegean
Ganges river water
Qatar/ Saudi border
Yemen/ Saudi border
Treatment of Greeks
in Albania
Thailand/ Vietnam
maritime boundaries
Sipadan and Ligitan islands
Batu Puteh island
Ethnic Russians in Baltic
Parties
Sudan, Iran, Uganda
Ethiopia, Eritrea
Sri Lanka, India
Iran, UAE
Malaysia, Philippines
Senegal, Mauritania
Turkey, Bulgaria
Russia, Iceland, Norway
China, Vietnam, Philippines,
Taiwan, Brunei
Namibia, South Africa
Sudan, Egypt
Ecuador, Peru
Russia, Latvia
Russia, Estonia
Latvia, Lithuania
India, Pakistan
Russia, Japan
China, Japan, Taiwan
Ukraine, Romania
Hungary, Slovakia
Ukraine, Russia
Ukraine, Russia
Nepal, Bhutan
Turkey, Greece
Greece, Turkey
Bangladesh, India
Qatar, Saudi Arabia
Yemen, Saudi Arabia
Greece, Albania
Thailand, Vietnam
Malaysia, Indonesia
Malaysia, Singapore
Russia, Baltic states
Outcome
unresolved
unresolved
unresolved
unresolved
petered out
petered out
unresolved
unresolved
resolved by negotiations
unresolved
resolved by mediation
unresolved
unresolved
unresolved
unresolved
unresolved
unresolved
resolved by negotiations
unresolved
unresolved
resolved by mediation
petered out
unresolved
unresolved
resolved by mediation
unresolved
unresolved
petered out
unresolved
unresolved
unresolved
unresolved
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Table A. 3- Variables of disputes referred to the UN between 1989-1996.
Dispute Intensity Spread Extent of Warfare
Invasion of Panama Moderate bilateral military
Falkland Islands Low bilateral none
Nicaragua civil war High regional military
Namibia High regional skirmishes
Lebanon High regional military
Iran-Iraq war High bilateral military
El Salvador civil war High bilateral military
Cambodia civil war High regional military
Arab-Israeli High regional skirmishes
Mozambique civil war High bilateral military
Aouzou Strip Moderate bilateral skirmishes
Rwanda, Burundi High regional military
Russian troops in Baltic Low regional none
Haiti Moderate regional skirmishes
North Korea and NPT Low global none
Angola civil war High global military
Greece and Macedonia Low bilateral none
Former Yugoslavia High regional military
Guatemala civil war High bilateral military
Afghanistan Civil war High global military
Cyprus Moderate regional skirmishes
Somalia High global limited military
East Timor High bilateral military
Western Sahara High regional military
Tajikstan High regional military
Liberia civil war High regional military
Kashmir Moderate bilateral skirmishes
Kurd homeland High global skirmishes
Hanish Islands Low bilateral military
Nagamo-Karabagh High bilateral military
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Dispute : Parties Power of Parties
4 ’
Invasion of Panama: US, Panama
Falkland Islands Britain, Argentina
Nicaragua: US, Nicaraguan factions
Namibia: South Africa, Namibia
Lebanon: Israel, Syria, Lebanese factions
Iran-Iraq war: Iran, Iraq
El Salvador US, El Salvador factions
Cambodia Vietnam, Cambodian factions
Arab-Israel Israel, Arab states, PLO
Mozambique. South Africa, Mozambique factions
Aouzou Strip: Libya, Chad
War b/w Hutus and Tutsis: Burundi, Rwanda
Russian troops in Baltic Russia, Baltic states
Haiti US, Haiti
North Korea and NPT US, North Korea
Angola: US, USSR, Cuba, South Africa
Angolan factions
Macedonia’s name: Greece, Macedonia
Former Yugoslavia Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia
Guatemala US, Guatemalan factions
Afghanistan: US, USSR, Pakistan, Afghan factions
Cyprus: Turkey, Greece, Cyprus
Somalia: US, Somalian factions
East Timor: Indonesia, Portugal,
East Timor factions
Western Sahara: Morocco, Algeria, Poiisario
Tajikstan Russia, Afghanistan, Tajik factions
Liberia: Liberian factions, Nigeria and other
members of the ECOWAS group
Kashmir. India, Pakistan
Kurds: US, Britain, France, Iraq, Turkey
Hanish Islands: Eritrea, Yemen
Nagamo-Karabagh Armenia, Azerbaijan
Superpower vs. smallest power
Large power vs middle power
Superpower vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Middle power vs smaller power
Superpower vs smallest power
Smaller power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. middle power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Smaller power vs. smallest power
Smallest power vs. smallest power
Large power vs. smaller power
Superpower vs. smallest power
Superpower vs. smaller power
Superpower vs. superpower
Middle power vs. smallest power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Superpower vs. smallest power
Superpower vs. superpower
Middle power vs. middle power
Superpower vs. smallest power
Middle power vs middle power
Smallest power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Smallest power vs. middle power
Large power vs. smaller power
Superpower vs. smaller power
Smallest power vs. smallest power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
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In disputes involving more than two parties I have coded the most
powerful party on each side as
Haas has done in his study. I have used the same five factors (GNP, GNP per capita.
Population,
Nuclear Capability and Prestige) as Cox and Jacobson to determine the
power of the each country 1
have, however, updated the figures used by them for GNP, GNP per capita and
Population, as their
analysis used figures from 1965 and these numbers have increased a
great deal since then.
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Table A.4- Variables of disputes not referred to the UN between 1989-1996.
Dispute Intensity Spread Extent of Warl
Sudan Civil War High regional military
Sri Lanka Civil War High bilateral military
Iran and UAE over 3 islands Low bilateral none
Malaysia and Philippines Low bilateral none
over Sabah
Senegal/ Mauritania border Moderate bilateral skirmishes
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria Low bilateral none
Fishing Rights in Low regional none
Barents Sea
Spratly islands Moderate regional skirmishes
Walvis Bay Low bilateral none
Sudan/ Egypt border Moderate bilateral skirmishes
Ecuador/ Peru border Moderate bilateral military
Russia/ Latvia border Low bilateral none
Russia/ Estonia border Low bilateral none
Latvia/ Lithuania Low bilateral none
maritime border
Siachin Glacier Moderate bilateral military
Kurile Island Low bilateral none
Senkaku Island Low bilateral none
Ukraine/ Romania border Low bilateral none
Ethnic Hungarians Low bilateral none
in Slovakia
Black Sea Fleet Low bilateral none
Ukraine’s Nuclear weapons Low bilateral none
Nepalese refugees Low bilateral none
Ethnic Turks in Greece Low bilateral skirmishes
Greece extending Low bilateral none
territory in Aegean
Ganges River water Low bilateral none
Qatar/' Saudi border Low bilateral skirmishes
Yemen/ Saudi border Moderate bilateral skirmishes
Ethnic Greeks in Albania Low bilateral skirmishes
Thailand/ Vietnam Low bilateral none
maritime boundary
Malaysia and Indonesia Low bilateral none
over Sipadan and Ligitan
Malaysia and Singapore Low bilateral none
over Batu Puteh island
Ethnic Russians in Baltic Low regional none
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Dispute
: Parties Power of Parties
Sudan Civil War: Iran, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda
Sri Lanka Civil War: India, Sri Lankan factions
Iran and UAE over 3 islands: Iran, UAE
Sabah: Malaysia, Philippines
Senegal/ Mauritania border: Senegal, Mauritania
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Turkey, Bulgaria
Fishing Rights in Barents Sea Russia, Norway,
Iceland
Spratly islands: China, Malaysia, Vietnam,
Taiwan, Brunei, Philippines
Walvis Bay: South Africa, Namibia
Sudan/ Egypt border: Egypt, Sudan
Ecuador/ Peru border Ecuador, Peru
Russia/ Latvia border Russia, Latvia
Russia/ Estonia border Russia, Estonia
Latvia/ Lithuania maritime border: Latvia, Lithuania
Siachin Glacier: India, Pakistan
Kurile Islands: Russia, Japan
Senkaku Island China, Japan, Taiwan
Ukraine/ Romania border: Ukraine, Romania
Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia. Hungary, Slovakia
Black Sea Fleet: Russia, Ukraine
Ukraine’s Nuclear Weapons: Russia, Ukraine
Nepalese refugees: Nepal, Bhutan
Ethnic Turks in Greece: Turkey, Greece
Aegean islands/ continental shelf: Greece, Turkey
Ganges River water
. India, Bangladesh
Qatar/ Saudi border: Saudi Arabia, Qatar
Yemen/ Saudi border: Saudi Arabia, Yemen
Ethnic Greeks in Albania: Greece, Albania
Gulf of Thailand: Thailand, Vietnam
Sipadan and Ligitan islands: Malaysia, Indonesia
Batu Puteh island: Malaysia, Singapore
Ethnic Russians in Baltic. Russia, Baltic states
Middle power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Smallest power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. large power
Large power vs. large power
Middle power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Large power vs middle power
Large power vs. middle power
Smallest power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. middle power
Middle power vs. middle power
Large power vs. smaller power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Middle power vs smallest power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Smaller power vs. middle power
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Large power vs. smaller powers
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Table A.5- Ratings of Security Council’s performance on the disputes referred to it
between 1985-1988.
Dispute Abating
conflict
Stopping
hostilities
Raids on neighboring
states by South Africa
0 0
Greenpeace Ship 1 NA
US intervening in
Nicaragua
0 0
Israeli raid on
Tunisia
0 NA
US raid on Libya 0 NA
Isolating
conflict
Settling
conflict
Raw Score Success
NA 0 0 None
NA 1 2 Some
NA 0 0 None
NA 0 0 None
NA 0 0 None
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Performance in the individual cases
In the disputes involving raids by South African forces in Lesotho and
Botswana in 1985, the Security Council condemned the acts and said that South
Africa should pay compensation for damages. However, South Africa refused to
pay any compensation and justified the raids as being necessary for destroying
bases of the African National Congress in its neighboring nations. In the case of
South African raids in Botswana, Zaire and Zambia, in 1987, a draft resolution
proposing that selective sanctions should be placed against South Africa to prevent
it from sending its forces into these nations again was considered, but was vetoed
by the United States and Britain. South African forces continued to attack these
nations, so I have given no points to the UN in abating the conflict, putting an end
to the skirmishes or settling the matter.
In the dispute between France and New Zealand over the Greenpeace ship I
gave the UN a rating of 1 in abating the conflict because the Secretary General
brought about an agreement between the two nations regarding the punishment
given to the French secret service agents responsible for sinking the ship. However
the dispute continued when the agents were released from their confinement by
the French government before the agreed term was over. New Zealand demanded
a return of the two agents and this matter was finally resolved by a three man
international tribunal which refused New Zealand’s demands for return of the
agents but condemned the actions of the French government. Therefore I have
given the UN a rating of 1 in settling the dispute.
In the dispute between the US and Nicaragua, the Security Council was
convened on many occasions by Nicaragua. But the US vetoed and blocked any
actions. In the General Assembly resolution 42/18 was adopted calling for US
compliance with the ICJ’s judgment in the case brought against it by Nicaragua
and resolution 42/176 was adopted which asked the US to lift its trade embargo
against Nicaragua. However the US refused to comply with the ICJ’s judgment
and continued to intervene in Nicaragua. So I have given no points to the UN in
abating or settling the conflict. I have given the UN no points in ending hostilities
between the two nations because the US continued to supply aid to the contras and
to the government of Honduras to continue the civil war in Nicaragua.
In the case of the Israeli raid on Tunisia, the Security Council condemned
the bombing as an act of aggression but refrained from imposing sanctions.
Security Council resolution 573 said that Tunisia had the right to appropriate
reparations. Some nations suggested that a penalty should be placed on Israel to
make it pay compensation to Tunisia, but this issue was never taken up in the
Security Council. Meanwhile Israel rejected the Security Council’s resolution
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saying that it had earned out the raid in Tunisia as it was a base for the PLO. Israel
also refused to pay any compensation. Therefore 1 have given the UN no points for
abating or settling the conflict.
In the dispute over the bombing of Libya by the US, a resolution
condemning the attack in the Security Council was vetoed by the United States,
France and Britain. The General Assembly condemned the attack in resolution
41/38 and said that Libya should get compensation from the US. However, Libya
received no compensation so I am giving the UN no points for abating or settling
the conflict.
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Table A.6- Outcome of disputes between 1985-1988 not referred to the UN.
Dispute Parties Outcome
Persecution of ethnic Hungarians Romania, Hungary petered out
Siachen Glacier India, Pakistan unresolved
Dispute over logging rights Laos, Thailand petered out
Spratly islands Vietnam, China unresolved
Hutu revolt Burundi, Rwanda petered out
Sudan Civil War Sudanese factions, Ethiopia unresolved
Dispute over 3 villages Laos, Thailand petered out
Persecution of ethnic Turks Turkey, Bulgaria petered out
Expulsion of Tunisian workers Libya, Tunisia resolved by negotiations
Use of Costa Rican territory
by contras
Nicaragua, Costa Rica resolved by negotiations
Aid provided to contras Nicaragua, Honduras resolved by negotiations
Missiles fired at Italian island Libya, Italy petered out
Fasht-al-Dibal island Bahrain, Qatar petered out
Taba enclave Egypt, Israel resolved by negotiations
Persecution of ethnic Albanians Yugoslavia, Albania petered out
Sri Lanka Civil War Sri Lanka, India unresolved
Kenya/ Uganda border Kenya, Uganda petered out
South Yemen/ Oman border South Yemen, Oman petered out
Vietnamese troop incursions Vietnam, Thailand petered out
Oil rights in Aegean Greece, Turkey unresolved
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Table A.7- Variables of disputes between 1985-1988 referred to the UN.
Dispute Intensity Spread Extent of warfare
South African raids Low regional skirmishes
Greenpeace ship Low bilateral none
US intervention in
Nicaragua
Moderate regional none
Israeli raid on Tunisia Moderate bilateral skirmish
US raid on Libya Moderate bilateral skirmish
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Dispute: Parties Power of Parties
South African Raids: South Africa, Botswana,
Zaire, Zambia, Lesotho
Greenpeace ship: France, New Zealand
US intervention in Nicaragua: US, Nicaragua
Israeli raid over Tunisia: Israel, Tunisia
US raid on Libya: US, Libya
Middle power vs. smallest power
Large power vs. smaller power
Superpower vs. smallest power
Middle power vs. smallest power
Superpower vs. smaller power
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Table A.8- Variables of disputes between 1985-1988 not referred to the UN.
Dispute Intensity Spread Extent of warfare
Sudan civil war High bilateral military
Laos and Thailand
over 3 villages
Low bilateral skirmishes
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria Low bilateral none
Libya’s expulsion of
Tunisian workers
Low bilateral none
Costa Rican territory
used by contras
Moderate regional skirmishes
Honduras aiding contras Moderate regional skirmishes
Missiles fired at Italian island Low bilateral skirmish
Fasht-al-Dibai island Low bilateral skirmish
Taba enclave Low bilateral none
Ethnic Albanians
in Yugoslavia
Low bilateral none
Sri Lanka civil war High bilateral military
Kenya/ Uganda border Low bilateral skirmishes
Vietnamese troops incursion Low bilateral skirmishes
Oil rights in Aegean Low bilateral none
Ethnic Hungarians
in Yugoslavia
Low bilateral none
Siachen Glacier Moderate bilateral military
Logging rights in Laos Low bilateral skirmishes
Spratly islands Moderate regional skirmishes
Hutu revolt Moderate bilateral military
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Dispute: Parties Power of parties
Sudan civil war: Sudanese factions, Ethiopia Smallest power vs. smallest power
Laos and Thailand over 3 villages: Thailand, Laos Smaller power vs. smallest power
Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria: Turkey, Bulgaria Middle power vs. smaller power
Expulsion of Tunisian workers: Libya, Tunisia Smaller power vs. smallest power
Costa Rican territory used by rebels: Costa Rica,
Nicaragua
Smallest power vs. smallest power
Honduras aiding contras: Nicaragua, Honduras Smallest power vs smallest power
Missiles fired at Italian island: Libya, Italy Smaller power vs. large power
Fasht-al-Dibal island: Bahrain, Qatar Smaller power vs. smallest power
Taba enclave Egypt, Israel Middle power vs. middle power
Ethnic Albanians in Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia,
Albania
Smaller power vs. smallest power
Sri Lanka civil war: India, Sri Lankan factions Large power vs. smallest power
Kenya/ Uganda border: Kenya, Uganda Smallest power vs. smallest power
Vietnamese troops incursion in Thailand: Vietnam,
Thailand
Smaller power vs. smaller power
Oil rights in Aegean Greece, Turkey Middle power vs middle power
Ethnic Hungarians in Romania: Hungary, Romania Smaller power vs. smaller power
Siachen Glacier: India, Pakistan Large power vs. smaller power
Logging rights in Laos: Thailand, Laos Smaller power vs. smallest power
Spratly islands: China, Vietnam, Malaysia
Taiwan, Brunei, Philippines
Large power vs. smaller powers
Hutu revolt: Rwanda, Burundi Smallest power vs. smallest power
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Table A.9- Ratings of regional organizations’ performance on the disputes referred
to them between 1989-1996.
Dispute
Nicaragua
Haiti
Mauritania and
Senegal
Aouzou Strip
Western Sahara
Somalia
Nigeria and
Cameroon
Lebanon
Kuwait invasion
Iran and UAE
Organization of American States
Abating
conflict
Stopping
hostilities
Isolating
conflict
Settling
conflict
Raw Score
1 1 1 1 4
1 1 NA 1 3
Organization of African Unity
2 0 NA 2 4
0 2 NA 0 2
1 1 0 0 2
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 NA 0 0
.Arab League
1 1 0 1 3
0 0 0 0 0
0 NA NA 0 0
Success
Some
Some
Great
Some
Some
None
None
Some
None
None
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Performance in the individual cases
Organization of American States
In the case of the Nicaragua civil war, I have given the OAS a score of 1 in
abating the conflict because it worked with the UN and 5 Central American
Presidents to bring about an agreement between the contra rebels and the
government which resulted in a cease fire and elections in 1990. 1 gave the
organization a score of 1 in stopping hostilities because even after the elections
there was some fighting by rebel groups. I gave the OAS a rating of 1 in isolating
the conflict because even as Honduras stopped supporting the contras, the US still
provided aid to them. I gave the OAS a score of 1 in settling the conflict because it
assisted the UN in observing the election process and in dismantling the
Nicaraguan resistance force, but even after these efforts, there was some civil
strife in the country.
I have given a score of 1 to the OAS in abating the conflict in Haiti
because it send an observer mission to the nation to look at human rights and to
facilitate distribution of humanitarian assistance. However the negotiations
between the two sides were carried out by a UN-OAS special envoy and also by
the US. The organization received 1 point for ending hostilities as political
violence continued in parts of the country. The OAS and the UN worked together
in the UN-OAS International Civilian Mission to ensure deployment of observers
and to monitor human rights before the elections. So I have given it a score of 1 in
settling the conflict.
Organization of African Unity
In the ethnic violence between Mauritania and Senegal, which was
triggered by a border incident over grazing rights, I have given the OAU a score of
2 in abating the conflict, as the OAU inter-African Commission and the Secretary
General mediated the dispute between the two nations. Riots between Arab
Mauritanians and black Senegalese began with the looting of Mauritanian shops in
Senegal and quickly spread to both countries. The strife ended when Mauritania
and Senegal called in their armies and put a curfew on their capitals, Dakar and
Nouakchott. I have given the OAU no points in stopping hostilities as it did not
play a role in ending the skirmishes. I have given it 2 point in settling the
conflict
because the organization was successful in mediating the dispute and
the two
countries restored relations in 1992.
In the dispute over the Aouzou strip I have given the OAU no points for
abating the conflict as its effort to mobilize a 6 nation African
peacekeeping force
ended in failure. It did, however, get Libya and Chad to agree to a cease
fire in
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1987 so I have given it 2 points for stopping hostilities. Later Chad and Libya took
their dispute before the ICJ so 1 have given the OAU no points in settling the
conflict.
In the case of Western Sahara, the UN secretary general was a joint
mediator with the president of the OAU between Morocco and POLISARIO.
Through their efforts Morocco recognized POLISARIO and agreed to a cease fire
and a referendum, so I have given the OAU a score of 1 in abating the conflict and
1 point for stopping hostilities. The OAU played no role in isolating the conflict
because Algeria ended its support to POLISARIO after it restored diplomatic
relations with Morocco. Finally I have given the OAU no points in settling the
conflict as the referendum never took place and POLISARIO backed out of the
agreement.
In the Somalian civil war the OAU had been making efforts since 1991 to
bnng peace among the warring factions. It send envoys to Somalia and contacted
leaders of all the factions and later organized a meeting in Ethiopia which was
attended by leaders of 26 factions, including the 2 mam ones of Aideed and Ali
Mahdi. The organization worked with the UN in 1992 to call for a cease fire.
However, its efforts have had no impact on the conflict and none of the cease fires
have held, so I am giving it no points for abating the conflict or stopping
hostilities. 1 am also giving it no points for isolating the conflict as US forces
intervened in the civil war. I have given it a score of 0 in settling the conflict as its
efforts did not lead to any accord between the factions and it was later
marginalized when the UN and the US became more involved in this conflict.
In the dispute over the Bakassi peninsula, the President of Togo acted as a
mediator on behalf of the OAU at the organization’s summit in Tunis in 1994.
Through his efforts, Nigeria and Cameroon agreed to set up a joint commission to
find ways to solve the problem in a peaceful way. However, later Cameroon
backed out and the commission was never established, so I have given the OAU no
points for abating the conflict. In 1996, after renewed fighting between the two
nations, the OAU mediator was successful in getting the foreign ministers of both
countries to accept the Kara agreement which called for a cease fire. Even then,
fighting and skirmishes continued, so I have given it a score of 0 in stopping
hostilities. Finally I have given the OAU no points for settling the conflict because
Cameroon has taken the issue before the ICJ and Nigeria has accepted that the ICJ
has jurisdiction over the case.
Arab League
In the case of the civil war in Lebanon, I have given the Arab League a
score of 1 in abating the conflict because its Tripartite Commission was
successful
in getting Syria and some of the factions to negotiate under the Taif
Agreement. I
gave the Arab League 1 point for stopping hostilities as a number of
militias have
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stopping fighting, but the conflict with Israeli forces continue. I have given it no
points for isolating the conflict as Israel and Syria are involved in Lebanon. I have
given the organization 1 point for settling the dispute as due to its efforts, the
central government has extended its power and restored order to most of Lebanon.
I have given the Arab League no points in abating the crisis following the
invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces as the organization split into two factions. One
side called for imposing economic sanctions on Iraq and providing troops for an
Arab defensive force in Saudi Arabia, while the other supported Iraq. As a result it
could take no collective security action. It was unable to stop the hostilities so I
have given it 0 points in this field. It was also unable to prevent a multinational
force led by the US to enter into the conflict so I have given it a score of 0 in
isolating the conflict. I gave the Arab League a score of 0 in settling the conflict
since it ended with the defeat of Iraq and the organization played no role in this
process.
In the conflict over three islands between Iran and United Arab Emirates,
the Arab League called on Iran to have serious negotiations with UAE to end the
dispute. It also supported UAE in its efforts to take the issue before the 1CJ, but
Iran refused to negotiate and rejected taking the case before the ICJ. So I have
given the Arab League no points for abating the conflict or settling it.
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Table A. 10- Ratings of regional organizations’ performance on the disputes
referred to them between 1985-1988.
Organization of American States
Dispute Abating Stopping Isolating Settling Raw Score Success
conflict hostilities conflict conflict
Honduras aiding 1 1 1 1 4 Some
contras
Organization of African Unity
Mali and Burkina 1 1 NA 0 2 Some
Faso over Agacher
Kenya/ Uganda 1 0 NA 1 2 Some
border
Arab League
Tunisia and Libya 0 NA NA
over expulsion of
workers
0 None
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Performance in the individual cases
Organization of American States
In the case of Honduras aiding the contra rebels against Nicaragua, 1 have
given the OAS a score of 1 in abating the conflict, as it worked with the UN and 5
Central American Presidents to bring about a regional agreement. The agreement
banned the use of the territory of any nation to attack another, and called for an
end to military aid to insurgents and urged withdrawal of foreign military forces. 1
gave the organization a 1 in stopping hostilities as even after this agreement was
signed, there was some sporadic violence along the border. I gave the OAS a score
of 1 in isolating the conflict, because due to its efforts and that of the UN and the
Contadora group, Honduras stopped providing aid to the contras, even as the US
continued to do so. I gave the OAS a rating of 1 in settling the conflict because
due to the efforts of all the groups involved in the peace process, Honduras ended
its support to the contras, and Nicaragua agreed to withdraw its troops from both
nations common border and end its invasions into Honduras in search of contra
forces.
Organization of African Unity
In the conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso over the Agacher Strip, 1
have given the OAU a score of 1 in abating the dispute because its secretary
general worked with the presidents of Togo, Niger, Libya and Nigeria to mediate
between the two nations in order to bring about a cease-fire. I have given the OAU
a rating of 1 in stopping hostilities as due to its efforts and that of the Presidents of
the other nations, the two nations agreed to a cease-fire. Neutral observers from
the nations formed a military observer’s team and went to the area to monitor the
pact. I have given the OAU no points for settling the conflict because the matter
was settled by the ICJ, and its decision was accepted by both sides.
In the dispute between Uganda and Kenya over their border, 1 have given
the OAU a score of 1 in abating the conflict, as its secretary general and the
president of Tanzania organized a summit between the presidents of the two
nations so that they could find a peaceful solution to their border conflict. 1 have
given no points to the OAU in stopping hostilities as the skirmishes between the
security forces along the border ended with the closure of the frontier between the
two nations. I have given the OAU a rating of 1 in settling the conflict as due to
the mediation of its secretary general and the President of Tanzania, the two
countries reopened their border after talks at the summit.
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Arab League
In the dispute between Tunisia and Libya, I have given the Arab League no
points for abating the conflict, since mediation by it failed to prevent the expulsion
of Tunisian workers from Libya. In retaliation Tunisia expelled Libyan diplomats.
Libya protested this move to the Arab League which failed to bring any
improvement in the situation. The two nations severed relations in 1985. They
restored relations in 1987, after Libya agreed to compensate the expelled workers
and to remove troops from its border with Tunisia. The Arab League played no
role in settling this conflict so I have given it no points in resolving this dispute.
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